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SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVISM:

A NEW BASIS FOR EVALUATIVE RESEARCH
Richard A. Ball

West Virginia University

ABSTRACT--Evaluative research has not kept pace with developments
in the theory of social planning and the philosophy of science.
If
evaluation is to contribute to social planning, evaluators must recognize that planning is a political process. The method of systemic
perspectivism may be able to provide a means of combining the virtues
of general systems theory with a perspectivistic view of objectivity,
allowing for a transactive planning which involves the public.

My purpose here is to describe what I consider to be the major
problem facing evaluative research and to indicate one direction by
which we might develop a methodology capable of providing a reasonable
solution. The problem has to do with the place of evaluation in the
planning process. Social planning as we have known it has tended toward one of two extremes; either the process has been characterized by
a rather chaotic eclecticism influenced by all sorts of questionable
motives, or it has followed a highly centralized, "social engineering"
approach. The former is clearly inappropriate, but the latter is itself
a matter of increasing social debate. What we need now is a new vision
of social planning and a methodology of evaluation which augments it.
Social engineering was developed In a time of rapidly centralizing
institutions which maintained a reality hegemony. These institutions
dominated planning because they had stepped into a near vacuum with
clear goals, a confidence born of faith in the application of technology, and a sense of their own power. Today it is different. Our goals
are now matters of political negotiation. We have begun to realize that
purely technological solutions may sometimes pose serious moral dilemmas. And some of the old arrogance of power is gone. Still, as long
as the evaluator remains a technician who does the bidding of the politician and the professional planner, we are not likely to see genuinely
sophisticated evaluative research or to witness the day when it becomes
a truly integral part of planning.
It is therefore necessary that the
evaluator look beyond his traditionally narrow province and concern himself with the larger issues of planning and even with the philosophy of
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science. He must understand that the planning process is political
rather than technical, and instead of complaining about this fact of life
he must learn to see it as appropriate to any society which presumes to
become a democracy.
If he accepts this view, he must seek to shift his
own role so as to broaden and deepen the functions of evaluation. Recent developments in the philosophy of science suggest that this shift
might be accomplished through a method of systemic perspectivism. To
understand what is entailed here, we must first consider developments
in the theory of social planning and then turn to questions of the philosophy of science. Social planning is the key to the evaluation question,
for evaluation must be an integral part of the planning process. The
philosophy of science may provide us with some new answers.
Developments in the Theory of Social Planning
Since our conceptions of evaluative research are embedded in our
general views of planning, it is well to begin with the latter. What
we discover is that some very significant changes are taking place in
the theory of social planning. These changes are reflected in a repudiation of the social engineering model and in an increasing emphasis
upon distributive equity (Webber, 1965) and societal learning models
(Dunn, 1971). What these newer approaches have in common is an appreciation of the difference between functional rationality and substantive
rationality in planning. Functional rationality attends to the efficient
relation of means to given ends. It is the province of the "expert,"
and its guiding principle is efficiency.
It rests upon the complicated
assumption that there is always one best way of dealing with a situation,
that this is synonymous with technical efficiency, and that technical
efficiency rests upon the ability to control all relevant factors. The
consequence is allocative planning, based on the distribution of limited
resources among a number of competing users (Friedmann, 1973:52). Examples of the results of such a narrow orientation may be found in the
increasing number of carefully documented studies of the actual consequences of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and planning, programming, budgeting systems (PPBS) (McKean and Anshen, 1965; Rivlin, 1969; Schick,
1971). These apparently precise techniques are usually nothing but a
means of legitimating and fine-tuning decisions which have already been
made.
The definition of evaluation as measurement of the outcome of a
"social experiment' is an unrealistic remnant of social engineering." It
can be traced to the older view which required only technicians capable
of testing the efficacy of means and to a reluctance to face several
harsh facts of life. To begin with, the evaluator rarely has much control over the "experiment" (Ball, 1977). There are particularly trea-

cherous pitfalls associated with evaluative research, which, unlike the
sheltered laboratory work so characteristic of the older sciences, often
finds Itself In non-cooperative, actively resistant and sometimes deliberately misleading environment (Gouldner, 1965).
The Issue of causality represents another serious set of questions
which must eventually be faced, simply because the notion of unillnear
cause-effect has little relevance In a complicated, Interdependent and
rapidly shifting social milleu (Ball, 1977; Weiss and Rein, 1969). The
singling out of "Independent" and "dependent" variables In such cases Is
largely a matter of which segment of a chain of events Is selected for
study. That Is why Katz (1971:56), citing the Increasing Importance of
social research In Supreme Court decisions, has entered a plea for a
"model by means of which scholars may direct themselves explicitly toward the Investigation of the empirical and logical foundations alleged
to Justify the causal Inferences that underlie the official policy under
Investigation." He argues that much official policy may rest upon "dlshonest pretensions" and that one function of policy research Is to "unmask" the causal fallacies upon which these pretensions rest. We encounter the same problems when we turn from a discussion of "causes" to an
examination of "effects." The focus upon effects defined as "primary",
along with an Insensitivity to the secondary and tertiary effects of a
given policy, represents one of the most serious violations of the principle of distributive equity central to recent theories of democratic
social planning (Webber, 1965). Which effects are to be considered

primary?
Finally, there Is the unpleasant fact that the evaluation criteria
themselves are often selected by someone else In terms of his own deflnItion of "success" and "failure". Suchman (1967:61), classifies the
criteria according to which the success or failure of a program can be
evaluated In terms of effort (Input assessment), effectiveness (output
assessment), Impact (output relative to need), cost effectiveness (input to impact ratio) and Process (descriptive and diagnostic analysis
of the process by which results are produced), but maintains that the
study of process Is really not an Inherent part of evaluative research
(Suchmn, 1967:21). Those who do express some Interest have tended to
equate process evaluation with rudimentary administrative monitoring
(see, for example, Rossi and Williams, 1972:110). One reason for the
skeptical attitude of many experienced politicians and administrators
toward current evaluation research Is their realization that the technical approach captures only a caricature of the political and social
realities with which they must deal (Rock, 1965). There Is certainly
limited practical value to the findings derived through the orthodox
designs. If we are very fortunate, we may learn what has happened, but
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the question of how it happened goes unanswered except for our often
simplistic assumptions about the variables which are "independent" and
those which are "dependent."
If the policy is a "failure" it may not
be clear just why, and even if judged a "success", we have no reasonable certainty that we can repeat the process.
In contrast to the technical narrowness of functional rationality,
substantive rationality rests upon intelligent insight into the behavior
of complex system as a whole, including a grasp of its ambiguities.
It
is concerned with the ends of action as much as with the means. It is
in the broadest sense political rather than technical. Substantive rationality makes possible innovative planning which is concerned with
larger questions of change and is characterized by an accent upon the
merging of planning and action activities. It leads us to a process of
"transactive planning" based upon involvement of all concerned (Friedmann, 1973). A proper social planning process is really an information
processing system. The better the information and the more effective
the processing,
the better the planning decisions.
We need better ways of getting information. Social planning has
long been characterized by institutionalized selective perception. The
process has been organized so as to give planners certain information.
Some means must be found to make transactive planning a reality, so that
all communication lines are open and attention is paid to the diversity
of goals which is to be found in a complex, modern society. I believe
that evaluative research has a major part to play here.
We also need to improve our information-processing, our sequence of decision-making. At the present time we find that decision-makers are
relatively isolated from immediate environmental feedback. They are
sheltered from the consequences of their decisions. We must open up
this process at every stage of development. Evaluative research may
also be our most important asset in this struggle for more effective
means of collective learning.
Evaluative Research and the Philosophy of Science
Our preoccupation with social engineering in the traditional sense
springs partly from our suspicion of "subjectivity." Evaluators are
much concerned with the problem of subjectivity, and a great deal has
been written over the issue of value-neutrality.
Indeed, social engineering makes much of the possibility that it can be handled through a
purely positive science which will eliminate the subjective element.
Social planning, however, involves value judgements, and there is no
way around this. Moreover, these questions of values cannot be separ-
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ated from the so-called "objective" facts of a situation.
40) has put it very effectively:

Vickers (1965:

An appreciation involves making judgements of fact
about the "state of the system," both Internally and
in its external relations.
I will call these reality
judgements. These include judgements about what the
state will be or might be on various hypotheses as well
as judgements of what is and has been. They may thus
be actual or hypothetical, past, present, or future.
It also involves making judgements about the significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body
for whom the appreciation is made. These judgements
I shall call value judgements. Reality judgements and
value judgements are inseparable constituents of appreciation... The relation between judgements of fact and
of value is close and mutual; for facts are relevant
only in relation to some judgement of value and judgements of value are operative only in relation to some
configuration of fact.
As Kuhn (1973) has reminded us, the history of science discloses a
tendency to elaborate and sanctify the dominant paradigm until it constitutes the very definition of science, setting the legitimate range of
inquiry, identifying research targets within that range, and dictating
appropriate methodology. The social engineering approach to planning
rests upon a positivist framework which assumes the existence of an
objective reality external to us and of an "objective" expert who can
describe It (Kolakowski, 1969), and this is the same epistemological
It
framework which undergirds our contemporary notion of evaluation.
is assumed that experts have access to the sphere of absolute reality
by way of strategies of quantification and experimentation (Kolakowski,
1969). Unfortunately, the tendency to attribute to this realm of "truth"
a unitary nature (Holzner, 1968) and to conceive of it as absolute and
eternal, static and changeless (Kolakowski, 1969) tends to produce a
reification of one point of view as the scientific truth of the matter.
This bias has interfered with the development of methods of equitable
evaluation, which may be defined as evaluative research which includes
the best possible representation of the diverse viewpoints to be found
in a highly differentiated, "open" society (Ball, 1977). The "truth"
turns out to be the version preferred by a certain segment of society.
Recently, however, we have begun to appreciate the extent to which
social life is an actually constructed reality (Berger and Luckmann,
Friedmann (1973) makes this notion central to his
1967; Holzner, 1968).
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theory of transactive planning, emphasizing the viewpoint as developed
by Mannheim (1936). At the same time, some research methodologists
have begun to stress the same orientation (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968).
Although one can hardly expect a new paradigm to emerge full-blown, it
may be worthwhile to consider general directions. At this point, it
appears that evaluative research might benefit greatly by explicit recognition of the extent to which reality is socially constructed through
the "intentionality" of actors whose meanings are formed in a matrix of
"inter-subjectivity"'(Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The merits of such an
approach are that it is politically sensitive to the changing nature of
social reality and that it emphasizes the political process which facilitate or impede planned change.
The approach with which we are dealing has been called perspectivism (Mannheim, 1936). It must not be confused with epistemological
idealism. This misunderstanding would appear to be the result of Husserl's emphasis upon attention to phenomena as they "appear" to us,
bracketing the question of whether or not they are "real." There has
been a great deal of confusion here. Strasser (1963:296-302) shows that
this "phenomenological impressionism" is essentially a "degeneration"
supported by tendencies toward a merely "suggestive" or "literary"
approach and criticizes the way in which phenomenology "came to be considered as an uncritical intuitionism." Referring to this trend as a
"strange attitude of mind," he points out that "no attention was paid
to the fact that the naiveness of seeing, which received so much praise,
could not even be genuine, for authentic naiveness is not aware of itself" (Strasser, 1963:297). Far from denying the existence of the world,
perspectivism insists that all thought must be treated as "situated" in
the world. Unlike the vulgarized versions of phenomenology which have
become so popular, perspectivism insists with Heidegger that some method
is needed precisely because the phenomena are not immediately given.
Although Mannheim gave us a new basis for soziai planning, he did
not succeed in providing a satisfactory methodology beyond an emphasis
upon the importance of substantive rationality and faith in the possibilities of a "detached intelligentia" which could learn to think in
perspectivistic terms. The problem, then, is to find a method which
will allow us to take account of social diversity. This would appear to
require that we accept some sort of "processual model" of social systems. Following Buckley (1967:17), we may regard the processual model
as an underdeveloped paradigm with a long history extending from the
work of Whitehead, Einstein, Dewey and Bentley in physical science and
philosophy to that of Marx, Simmel, Cooley and Thomas in social science.
As Buckley himself has stressed, this model is most clearly exemplified
by general systems theory (GST).
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The "perspectivism" of Mannheim and the "Biperspectivism" of GST
(Laslo, 1972:119) stress a holistic approach and the epistemological
importance of perspective rather than the isolation of analytical variables assumed to be independent of perception.
Instead of arguing over
the importance of subject vs. object, both attempt to concentrate on
relationships in the form of interplay between the two, and both emphasize feedback loops rather than "causes."
Sutherland (1974:55) quotes
with approval the following statement:
Analysis has to proceed at two levels: that of
phenomenology, that is of direct experience, encompassing perception of outside things, feeling, thinking, willing, etc., and of conceptual constructs, the
reconstruction of direct experience in systems of
symbols, culminating in science, it being well understood that there is no absolute gap between precept
and concept, but that the two levels intergrade and
interact (von Bertalanffy, 1967:94).
The "reconstruction of direct experience in systems of symbols" is
another definition of GST. A combination of perspectivism and GST provides a method which may be designated as systematic perspectivism.
Since I have dealt with this method elsewhere (Ball, 1977) there is no
need to go into much detail as to the actual practice of systemic perspectivlsm. What I am concerned about here is its applicability to the
newer vision of social planning. It is especially applicable to the
notion of societal learning, because one would expect information exchange to open a variety of feedback loops, leading to more efficient
mapping of perceived reality and an emerging consensus as to its nature.
Information is in fact sometimes defined as that input which increases
order. Only when the public is deeply involved in mutual learning
through some sort of transactive planning is it possible to open up information flow. Social engineering actually tends to close off information, giving a surface appearance of order which only serves to hide the
disorder beneath.
My own experience, including evaluations of Community Action Agencies developed during the War on Poverty, assessments of curriculum impact, and evaluation of criminal justice programs, suggests that systemic perspectivism might be a powerful tool for policy studies. During
the evaluation of one Community Action Agency, policy was seen not as an
"experiment" (which implies tight control, clear resolution of the causality problem, and the power of the experimenter to select the experimental criteria) but rather as a new component introduced within an ongoing system. It became clear that the program of the Agency was signi-
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ficantly affected by such external variables as the pattern of power in
the local community and that these forces had to be identified and their
effect somehow assessed. The approach which was worked out has been deIt led to the construction of
scribed in detail elsewhere (Ball, 1970).
a model of coalitions of power which represented a system operating in
accordance with specific rules but shifting its internal structure with
variations in issues, with disagreements endemic to the system itself,
and with the inputs of suprasystems external to the local community.
Different definitions of events were held by different factions, but the
foundations of these perspectives could be determined. The planners were
occasionally among the least objective participants in the "experiment."
Such an approach means that we move to make the neglected question
of process our central area of inquiry, using the merely technical questions of effort, effectiveness, impact, and cost effectiveness as subsidiary aspects of the process itself. Such an approach would allow us to
direct the unrealized potential for evaluation to every stage of social
policy. Evaluative research has so far tended to be of little help here,
being generally limited to the implementation stage and the measurement
of input-output differences. This conception of evaluation is not based
upon an analysis of the data requirements underlying sound public policy,
but is simply the logical outcome of adherence to the social engineering
tradition. What is urgently needed is research and development with an
emphasis upon the development of more effective means of problem definition and policy formulation. We must deal with the entire process.
Evaluative research must itself be evaluated primarily in terms of
its applicability to contemporary planning problems and not as another
interesting academic exercise. Opportunities appear to be most promising if the evaluator can see research neither as the simple testing of
a priori hypotheses nor as an unguided "exploration," but as a continuous self-corrective process of successive approximations leading toward
"grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Among other things, this
means that theoretical sampling, a technique by which the process of
data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, must be employed
as a complement to the usual statistical sampling based on pre-selected
criteria. As I have tried to explain in greater detail elsewhere (Ball,
1977), the evaluator who studies process must use a flexible methodology which combines the traditionally respected virtues of the detached,
rigorous data manipulating technicians with the practical abilities and
concerns of the skilled craftsman (Mills, 1959), the data gathering
opportunities of the strategically placed and highly trained participant
(Bruyn, 1966), the probing orientation of the clinician (Gouldner,1965),
the skepticism of the investigative journalist (Sjoberg and Miller,
1973) and even the opportunistic hypothesis formulation of the detective
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(Sanders, 1974).

This will make him of greatervalueto the planner.
Conclusion

The new emphasis in social planning takes us away from the older
social engineering tradition and toward a transactive planning which involves the public more closely. Planning is increasingly understood as
a political and not a technical process, as a question of societal learning rather than imposed solutions based upon the selective perception of
a technical elite. This change makes even more important the transition
from positivism to a view of society as a socially constructed reality,
a transition which is at the core of the contemporary philosophy of
science. It means that the perspectivism of Mannheim can be taken not
only as a basis for social planning, but also as a basis for its evaluation. Evaluative research can also draw upon general systems theory.
The combination of these two traditions provides us with a systemic perspectivism which can greatly broaden the functions of evaluative research,
so as to assist at every stage of social planning
It is important to emphasize the distinction between systemic perspectivism and the technical "systems analysis" approach to social planning. The latter represents social engineering.
It is a "new utopianism" in the sense that it carries the social engineering tradition to
extremes, tending to emphasize efficiency over the humanitarian values
of traditional utopian thought (Boguslaw, 1965). GST has now developed
beyond the extremely mechanistic positivism of systems analysis. Integrated with perspectivism, GST may actually provide a means of transcending the epistemological and sociopolitical pitfalls of systems analysis
without sacrifice of rigor.
Systemic perspectivism may allow us to take account of our lack of
experimental controls, avoid spurious causal attributions, and assume a
more politically sophisticated stance with respect to criteria selection.
Even If we could attain it, do we really want to make the public into
"subjects" for experimentation? We can continue to maintain the fiction
here, or we may candidly acknowledge the lack of experimental controls
and accept the components of social policy as open systems rather than
closed experiments. A systemic perspectivism is capable of this, especially if the entire process is subjected to study.
It will also allow
the planners to involve the public fully without fear that this will
"bias the experiment." There is no doubt that such a stance would subject many evaluators to pressures which technicians are not usually
called upon to face. But unless the truth is acknowledged and means are
found to operate in the light of reality, evaluative research will lose
its leverage as a means of affecting public policy.
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As to the problem of causality, systemic perspectivism stresses the
extent to which "cause" and "effect" are matters of perspective. GST
tells us that reality is reciprocally related through feedback processes,
and these feedback processes involve a combination of value judgements
and reality judgements. What social planning must do is put the two together. Technical social engineering will not help us with this sort of
problem, but evaluative research which deals with the entire planning
process can tell us a great deal.
It should be clear that different goals and assessments of means
need not be viewed relativistically. Given that different groups observe
social reality from different perspectives, it is still possible that
some have a better vantage point than do others. If evaluation can be
extended to the study of secondary and tertiary effects, it will be possible to provide those concerned with valuable information which may
serve to clarify or even alter their perspectives. In this sense, information increases freedom of rational choice and may actually be thought
of as a basis for a more objective value judgment by all concerned. This
then is societal learning at its best. Although the subjective element
cannot be eliminated completely, it can be rendered more objective to
the extent that assumptions can be brought nearer alignment with reality
as perceived by a system willing to expose itself to environmental input. Systemic perspectivism can facilitate this. It is as a whole a
method of evaluative research almost ideally suited to the new problems
of social planning and the new theories which offer political rather
than technical solutions.
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